National Banks -- State Tax Immunity by Solomon, Michael Bruce
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 1 Article 13 
10-1-1969 
National Banks -- State Tax Immunity 
Michael Bruce Solomon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Bruce Solomon, National Banks -- State Tax Immunity, 24 U. Miami L. Rev. 189 (1969) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol24/iss1/13 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
CASES NOTED
NATIONAL BANKS-STATE TAX IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs, national banking institutions, brought suit against the
Comptroller of the State of Florida and others to restrain them from
levying, assessing, or collecting: 1) sales and use taxes on goods
and services purchased or rented by plaintiffs; 2) intangible personal
property taxes upon mortgages owned and recorded by them; and 3)
documentary stamp taxes on notes, mortgages, or other evidences of
indebtedness or shares of stock owned by plaintiffs. They contended that
Florida was unable to lay these taxes upon them, as they were immune
from such types of state taxation as instrumentalities of the federal
government pursuant to the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 548. Upon the
plaintiffs' respective motions for summary judgment, the District Court,
sitting as a three-judge court, held, injunction granted: national banking
institutions, created and existing pursuant to federal statutes, were "in-
strumentalities of the United States" and therefore immune from these
state and local taxes which were not within the purview of the federal
statute (12 U.S.C. § 548) dealing with state taxation of national banks.
First National Bank v. Dickinson, 291 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Fla. 1968),
aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 409 (1969). 1
The oft-cited and much criticized case of M'Culloch v. Maryland2
is necessarily the jumping off point for any discussion of state power to
tax a national bank. In 1819 the United States Supreme Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Marshall, declared a state tax on the Second Bank
of the United States unconstitutional, as it constituted a "tax on the
operation of an instrument employed by the government of the Union
to carry its powers into execution."'3 This impliedly became a violation of,
for want of a better alternative, the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution.4 Six years thereafter, in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,' the Court applied M'Culloch to strike down an Ohio statute
extracting a tax from all businesses not authorized to do business in the
1. The applicability of this case to the status of national banking institutions in this
state and its resulting effect upon Florida's tax revenue scheme has recently brought unan-
ticipated results in a related revenue area, with serious depletions of state coffers expected.
The Florida Legislature recently passed a supposedly routine "Reviser's Bill" regulating
savings and loan associations. Without being noticed before passage, it contained a
clause providing that these associations could not be taxed in a different manner or at a higher
rate than any other financial institution in this state. This would of course include national
banks, who, under the instant case, are immune from state sales and use taxes. Previous to
the passage of the bill into law, Florida savings and loan associations were afforded no such
tax immunity. The loss in revenue is expected to cost Florida $6 million a year. Repeal of the
clause will be attempted at the next session of the legislature with the tacit approval
of the savings and loan industry. Florida's Attorney General has cast some doubt, however,
that the bill would have this effect.
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3. Id. at 436-37.
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
S. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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state. This necessarily included the national bank in question and ex-
cluded those that were state chartered.
These decisions, as well as others, 6 provoked sharp controversy in
Congress regarding the extent to which states should be allowed to tax
national banks.7 The result of this controversy was a compromising Act8
designed to satisfy both those in favor of broad state taxation power and
those desirous of complete federal immunity in this area.9 The scope and
delineation of this Act was first remarked upon by the Supreme Court
in 1899, in the case of Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro.10
There the Court struck down a Kentucky non-discriminatory franchise
tax laid upon a national bank. The Court declared:
This section, then, of the Revised Statutes is the measure
of the power of a State to tax national banks, their property or
their franchises. By its unambiguous provisions the power is
confined to a taxation of the shares of stock in the names of the
shareholders and to an assessment of the real estate of the bank.
Any state tax therefore which is in excess of and not in con-
formity to these requirements is void."
Starting with Owensboro, a long line of decisions have shown that
12 U.S.C. § 548 furnishes the exclusive rule for state taxation.' 2 There-
fore, any state or local assessment not in conformity with it has been
declared invalid,'8 with national banks being subject to taxation only
as provided by the statute. 4 This result obtains because a state's power
to tax is derived entirely from federal legislation. 5
In its present form, 12 U.S.C. § 54816 embodies what its framers
6. Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829). See also notes 12-15, 26, 33-36,
inIra, and accompanying text.
7. Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 342 (1968).
8. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 111, which was a forerunner of 12
U.S.C. § 548 (1945).
9. Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 342 (1968).
10. 173 U.S. 664 (1899).
11. Id. at 669.
12. Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968); Bank of Calif. Nat'l
Ass'n v. Richardson, 248 U.S. 476 (1919); Covington v. First Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 100
(1905); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. N.Y., 121 U.S. 138 (1887); New York v. Weaver, 100
U.S. 539 (1879); Tarrant v. Bessemer Nat'l Bank, 7 Ala. App. 285, 61 So. 47 (1912). See
note 16 infra.
13. First Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 258 U.S. 362 (1922). See also Owensboro Nat'l Bank
v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899); New York v. Weaver, 100 U.S. 539, 543 (1879).
14. City of Pittsburgh v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Pa. 45 (1867).
15. Cherokee State Bank v. Wallace, 202 Minn. 582, 279 N.W. 410 (1938); First Nat'l
Bank v. Township of St. Joseph, 46 Mich. 526, 9 N.W. 838 (1881); State Bank v. Calvert,
357 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
16. This section's salient provisions are as follows:
The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the pro-
visions of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national
banking associations located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said
shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an
owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4)
according to or measured by their net income . ...
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sought to accomplish. Their aim of absolute prohibition of state taxation
of national banks was effected by the nonrecognition of any power of the
states to tax the banks, except as to their real estate. On the other hand,
preservation of state taxing powers over financial resources engaged in
its development were retained by permitting state taxation of bank share-
holders so as not to maintain a haven for investments free from state
taxation.' Furthermore, these provisions were coupled with a limitation
preventing the above from being exercised in a discriminatory manner
against national banks.'"
In 1923, a substantial amendment to the statute authorized state
taxation of national bank incomes and dividends,' 9 and declared that
bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness in the hands of individ-
uals were not to be considered moneyed capital coming into competition
with national banks.20 Again, in 1926, Section 548 was amended to permit
states to levy excise and franchise taxes measured by the entire income
of the banks,2' but an attempt to allow states to levy sales and use taxes
was unsuccessful.22
In spite of this seemingly impregnable wall of case and statutory
authority, several decisions have flown in the face of federal immunity
from state taxation. The most important rationale employed to permit
state taxation of these institutions is to have the tax incident fall upon
some third party, such as a retailer selling to a national bank, and have
the third party collect the tax for the state-although the payment of
the tax is in reality by the bank. 23 This fiction is, however, being repu-
diated by the later, now controlling cases. 24 This argument, of course,
is limited in applicability to those taxes which conceivably could
have their incidence shifted, not including use, personal property, doc-
umentary stamp, and similar taxes.
In addition, attacks upon national bank tax immunity have been
of a broader, more general nature. This manifests itself in the general
trend which jurisdictions have taken in regard to the labeling of a tax-
1. (a) The imposition by any State of any of the above four forms of tax-
ation shall be in lieu of the others ....
3. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations
from taxation in any State or in any subdivision thereof, to the same extent, accord-
ing to its value, as other real property is taxed.
12 U.S.C. § 548 (1945).
17. Senator Fessenden, Chairman of the Finance Committee, so stated in his remarks
on § 548. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1895 (1864).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 548 1(c) (1945). "[Blut at no higher rate than is imposed on dividends
from such other corporations." See note 16 supra.
19. Act of March 4, 1923, ch. 267, 42 Stat. 1499. See note 16 supra.
20. Id.
21. Act of March 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223.
22. See Hearing on S. 2547 Before the Subcomm. on Federal Reserve Matters of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1950).
23. Western Litho. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d 156, 78 P.2d 731 (1938).
24. Id. See Annot., 117 A.L.R. 838-39 (1938) (petitioner's brief synopsis). See also
Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
payer as a "federal instrumentality." Courts have applied established
guidelines to determine whether or not an entity has reached the status
of a federal "agency. 25 Some courts have, in fact, rejected as insufficient
ihose very characteristics which were used to establish a national bank's
federally immune status in First Agricultural National Bank of Berkshire
County v. State Tax Commission,"' the sole and controlling case cited
in First National Bank of Homestead.
2 7
The altered character of the national banks provides the tax im-
munity critics substantial ammunition. Today's national bank, while part
of the Federal Reserve System, does not hold membership therein ex-
clusive of counterpart state banks, nor does it perform the important
federal securities and currency functions it once did.2 Congress has
heretofore provided national banks with features designed to make them
more competitive with their state brethren, such as branch banking,29
fiduciary powers,"° and rates of interest on loans"' and savings deposits 2
similar to those of other banks. In short, they enjoy all of the advantages
of state chartered financial institutions, but suffer none of the detriments.
Though other jurisdictions provide us with a plethora of decisions
in this area, Florida has had but three prior to the instant case. In 1898,
the then Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Florida statute requiring
a national bank to pay personal property taxes as agent for its share-
holders, retaining a lien upon their investment assets for the amount
paid, was invalid as applied to an insolvent national bank with no share-
holder assets to levy upon. 3 The court held this amounted to a M'Cul-
loch-Osborn violation; that is, state taxation upon a "bank chartered by
congress. 5 4
The cases of Roberts v. American National Bank of Pensacola5 and
Folsom v. First National Bank of Graceville,6 came before the supreme
court in 1929. Although the supreme court affirmed lower court
decrees adjudging discriminatory taxation of bank shareholders to be
invalid, the court spoke as to the scope of 12 U.S.C. § 548 as follows:
25. Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941); Clallan County
v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923); Union Pac. R.R. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
532 (1873).
26. 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
27. Union Pac. R.R. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 27 (1873). Cf. Broad River Power
Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178 (1933).
28. See Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 353-59 (1968) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
29. 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1964).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1964).
31. 48 Stat. 191 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
33. Stapylton v. Thaggard, 91 F. 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1898).
34. Id.
35. 97 Fla. 411, 121 So. 554 (1929).
36. 97 Fla. 424, 121 So. 559 (1929).
CASES NOTED
The foregoing Act of Congress prescribes the full measure
of the power of the state to impose taxes upon national bank
associations or their shareholders. Any assessment not in con-
formity therewith is unauthorized and invalid."7
In the instant case, the United States District Court reached the
only decision which precedent would allow. In doing so it cited but one
recent Supreme Court decision, First Agricultural National Bank of Berk-
shire County v. State Tax Commission,38 and but two statutes contained
in the United States Code-12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq., which the court noted
contained provisions creating national banks, and 12 U.S.C. § 548, pre-
viously discussed. 9 In Berkshire, the majority reached the correct, if
archaic, result by referring to the M'Culloch, Osborn, and Owensboro
cases by impliedly showing that a taxpayer did not have to be wed to
the government to be dubbed a federal instrumentality.4' By the same
token, Berkshire County contained, in Justice Marshall's dissent,41 a well-
reasoned argument against immunity, placing its reliance primarily upon
the now nonfederal character of national banks. Secondarily, it attacked
the premise of § 548 providing the sole criteria for state taxation. 2
Apparently, there is some small authority for this position.4
While the instant case sought injunctive relief as opposed to a
declaratory judgment, and involved personal property taxes in addition
to the sales and use taxes of Berkshire County, the facts common to both
cases provided sufficient grounds for the District Court in the instant
case to go no further than to label the plaintiff banks federal instrumen-
talities.
Every tax that the court restrained Florida from further levying,
assessing, or collecting has had occasion to be declared invalid as applied
to national banks by states: sales 44 and use taxes,45 intangible personal
property taxes,46 and taxes on evidences of indebtedness.47
37. Roberts v. American Nat'l Bank, 97 Fla. 411, 417, 121 So. 554, 557 (1929).
38. 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
39. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 291 F. Supp. 855, 856 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
40. 392 U.S. 339 (1968). See the Court's treatment of the Red Cross as a federal
agency in Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 360 (1966).
41. 392 U.S. 339, 348-59 (1968).
42. Id. at 359-63.
43. Accord, Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 370, 235 N.E.2d 101, 108,
288 N.Y. S.2d 331 (1967). Cf. Tradesmens Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309
U.S. 560 (1940).
44. Western Litho. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d 156, 78 P.2d 731
(1938). See also Nat'l Bank v. Dept. of Revenue, 334 Mich. 132, 54 N.W.2d 278 (1952);
Nat'l Bank v. City of Covington, 21 F. 484 (C.C.S.D. Ky. 1884), aff'd, 198 U.S. 100 (1905).
45. Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968). But cf. Bank of
America v. Bd. of Equalization, 209 Cal. App. 2d 708, 26 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1962).
46. Intangible personal property tax is not a "tax under any other form of taxation
substituted by the general assembly for the tax on bank shares." General Am. Life Ins. Co.
v. Bates, 363 Mo. 143, 249 S.W.2d 458 (1952).
47. Central Nat'l Bank v. McFarland, 20 F.2d 416, 418-20 (D. Kan. 1927), aff'd, 26
F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 606 (1928).
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Since the Berkshire County decision, courts have been obligated to
vouchsafe national banks from the reach of state coffers. It was observed
in Berkshire County:
Because of § 548 and its legislative history, we are con-
vinced that if a change is to be made in state taxation of national
banks, it must come from the Congress, which has established
the present limits.48
If anyone is to act in reversing the policy of according tax-free treatment
to national banks49 it must, indeed, be the Congress, for the courts have
shown that they are unwilling to respond to change conditions in this area.
MICHAEL BRUCE SOLOMON
ONE PARTY'S CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE'
The defendant was a uniformed police officer who suggested to one
Matthews, an employee of Wells Fargo Armored Service, that he allow
the defendant and "pros" to "hold him up" with the understanding that
no one would be hurt and that Matthews would get a share of the money.
Matthews reported the proposition to his employer and the F.B.I., who
persuaded him to pretend to acquiesce in the defendant's plan. Matthews
arranged to meet the defendant and the "pro" at the Orange Bowl. The
police and the F.B.I. put a microphone and transmitter on the person of
Matthews and sent him to the meeting equipped to record the conver-
sations of the parties. Thereafter, there were numerous telephone con-
versations between the defendant and Matthews in which the proposed
robbery was discussed. These conversations were recorded by the police
with the knowledge and consent of Matthews.
Subsequently the robbery took place. The numerous police officers
who had staked out the scene of the robbery apprehended the defendant.
The defendant was adjudicated guilty pursuant to a jury verdict. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal, for the state of Florida, Third Dis-
trict, held, affirmed: An incriminating recording received from electronic
48. 392 U.S. 339, 346 (1968).
49. Comptroller Fred 0. Dickinson, shortly after the Supreme Court affirmance, sent
a resolution to the Florida Congressional Delegation which expressed, in part, the following:
In these days of rising costs and increased demand for public services, Florida
can ill afford to lose even a penny in revenue much less the millions of dollars
that would be taken away if needed legislation [is] not passed.
It [the legislation] means that national banks will not be discriminated against,
but at the same time they will no longer enjoy immunity from state and local taxes.
Miami Review, Mar. 6, 1969, at 16, col. 1.
See also address by Hon. Ralph Turlington, Speaker of the House, Fla. Legislature,
Aug. 22, 1969, calling for federal legislation permitting states to tax national banks. Senator
Spessard Holland of Florida has recently also called for federal legislation either modifying
or repealing 12 U.S.C. § 548.
